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At present, there is little general agreement whether Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) does (or even can) make a net positive con-
tribution to the process of development. On the one hand, propo-
nents note that FDI provides a means for the transfer of capital,
technology, and managerial skills to developing countries, that it
can generate considerable tax revenues, create employment and provide
access to international markets. On the other hand, negative argu-
ments range from its excessive cost and/or the inefficient use of re-
sources vis-a-vis development goals to increased dependence upon in-
dustrial countries, a loss of sovereignty, and the undermining of
cultural values. Often points can be argued both ways depending on
one's vantage point. For example, FDI can be seen as either a means
of breaking local monopolies, or as dominating and thus restricting
competition in host country markets.
Even after the hyperbole on both sides has been cleared away,
the answer is by no means determinate. FDI has the potential to
transfer much needed resources to developing countries. Yet, resources
are not transferred in the abstract; they are embodied in a business
enterprise responsible to an authority in an industrialized country
interested in maximizing an objective which may or may not relate posi-
tively to development goals. Furthermore, while much of the argument
(and certainly the vast majority of empirical work) to date has con-
centrated on its "economic" effects, it is clear that FDI is enmeshed
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in the entire socio-cultural and political fabric of the host society.
FDI is an agent in the process of cultural borrowing that constitutes
industrialization; it is a cross-cultural change agent.
The objective of this research is to empirically investigate the
relationship between FDI, as a vehicle for the cross-cultural transfer
of management and technology, and social change in developing countries.
The investigation is cross-national, with data obtained from fifty-
nine countries. After a theoretical framework is presented, three
conceptually significant aspects of social modernization arc derived
from a larger number of raw indicators via factor analysis. A relation-
ship is then established between each of the aspects of social structure
(as dependent variables) and an index of industrialization. An index
of FDI (relative to economic size) is then introduced as a second
independent variable in both simple additive and multiplicative or
interactive form. The paper concludes that while there is no evidence
of a direct or additive relationship between the aspects of social structure
and the relative importance of FDI, an interactive relationship is con-
sistent with the data.
Industrialization and social modernization
1. Industrialization, defined as the application of inanimate
2
sources of power to the productive process, inevitably leads to an
increased emphasis on economic efficiency and increases in the scale
3
of productive enterprise. The requirements of both efficiency and
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scale conflict with the diffused roles, economic independence and
self-sufficiency, very restricted horizontal and vertical mobility,
ascriptively determined status, particularistic relationships, and
in general, the social structures characteristic of traditional soci-
4
eties. This conflict between the requisites of industrialization
and the structure of traditional life results in pressures for change.
The changes in social structure that result directly from the indus-
trialization of a traditional society are explicitly defined as social
modernization in this research.
2. The industrialization of the current Less Developed
Countries (LDCs) can be characterized as a process of acculturation
or culture contact. This involves the transfer of machines, iiroducts,
technology, managerial skills, and importantly, entire formal organi-
zations from the Industrialized Western nations. However, the indus-
trialization of the LDCs tends to be inverted relative to the Western
experience. In the West, productive institutions and social structures
evolved simultaneously over an extended period of time. In the LDCs
productive institutions and organizations tend to be imported and
superimposed upon traditional societies.
Thus, industrialization is introduced as an exogenous variable
which in turn affects the symmetry of its causal relationship witli
Q
social modernization. To a significantly greater extent than was
true in the West, the flow of causality is unidirectional; imlustriaL-
ization in the LDCs may be taken as producing or causing changes in
9
social structure or social modernization.
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3. The broadscale industrialization of traditional societies
results in a cross-cultural convergence of social structures to a more
limited range of alternatives. This applies only to those social
structures directly affected by industrialization; it does not apply
to society in general, to political systems or to all aspects of
culture. It simply recognizes that the range of variation in social
structures consistent with productive institutions narrows as a
society industrializes.
Furthermore, convergence is a long-term process and there are
very significant differences in the structure of societies at early
and intermediate stages of industrialization. This variation can be
taken as a function of: (1) preindustrial social structure and (2)
the path or trajectory of industrialization.
4. The path or trajectory of industrialization is a function
of the nature of the cross-cultural contact or the process of acciiltu-
12
ration. Contacts can be indirect (printed matter) or direct (sLudeiU
exchanges) and discontinuous (technical aid missions) or continuous
(colonialization) . While the ultimate results of cultural borrowing
depend upon the aspect of culture transferred, the nature of the
contact, and host receptivity, one would expect that the chances of
a successful transfer and adoption are greater (ceteris paribus) the
more direct and continuous the contact. Thus, the extent of the
pressure for social modernization (as defined in this research) is
a function of the path or trajectory of Industrialization whiili In
turn depends, to a large extent, upon the nature of the culture contact,
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Foreign Direct investment
Foreign direct investment involves equity ownership extended
across national frontiers accompanied by a significant degree of
13
managerial control. In the context of this research FDI serves
primarily as: (1) a vehicle for the transfer of the basic elements
of industrialization — management and technology — and (2) a means
for Western investors to exert a direct and continuous influence
(managerial control) in LDCs.
Since FDI serves as important, if not the primary, vehicle for
14
the transfer of the institutions of industrialization to LDCs, it
must, by definition, affect the process of social raoderniziit ion.
However, if it has a unique effect, we should be able to demonstr.ite
that the process of cross-cultural transfer associated with FDI differs
from the other vehicles for the transfer and diffusion of the institu-
tions of industrialization. It is posited that this unique effect
exists and is a function of: (1) the direct and continuous nature
of the culture contact associated with FDI and (2) differences in
the philosophy and style of management found in indigenous and foreign
enterprise.
The implications of the first point should be clear from the
discussion thus far. FDI provides for a direct and continuous contact
between cultures. Thus, ceteris paribus, to the extent FDI is rela-
tively important in a given society, one would expect industrialization
to follow a path which intensifies the pressures for social modernization.
FDI acts as a change agent or catalyst; it affects the pace and the
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extent of the social changes resulting from industrialization.
The second point requires some explanation. To the extent large
scale indigenous enterprises exist in a relatively traditional
society, they are likely to be owned and managed by individuals of
high status. It is reasonably clear that large scale industrial
enterprises do not generally grow out of small commercial ventures.
In many LDCs, upper status individuals are the only ones with the
capital (or access to capital), organizational ability, and importantly,
the connections often required .
To the extent such individuals are either a product of or owe
their position to the traditional social system, there is little im-
petus to innovate — to establish new patterns of social relationships —
and much pressure to accomodate. In contrast, the foreign controlled
firm occupies a position analogous to that of the marginal man in
the host culture. While integrated into the host socio-economic system,
its origins are rooted in an industrialized culture and it is responsive
to external direction. Thus, within the constraints posed by the host
social system, it is more likely to innovate and less likely to reach
accommodation with traditional values and relationships than is the
indigenous firm. Except as the realities of the local environment
require, the foreign controlled enterprise is less likely to be
bound by traditional attitudes and values and traditional social
relationships.
Managerial recruitment policies provide a case in point. Studies
in both Brazil and India have shown that foreign controlled firms
are more likely to recruit and promote capable lower status Individuals
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into managerial positions than are indigenous enterprises. The
latter tend to be owned and managed by local elites with recruit-
ment (at least to the managerial ranks) so limited. Thus, within
limits, foreign firms may provide a channel for upward mobility that
either does not exist or is severely restricted in a traditional society.
In net, what is posited is that first, industrialization, as a
process of cross-cultural transfer of institutions, produces or
causes changes in the social structure of traditional societies
(social modernization). Second, to the extent FDT is relatively
important in a given society we would expect the pressures for
social modernization (produced by industrialization) to be intensified.
In operational terms we are positing an interactive rel.it ionship.
We would not expect to find a direct or additive relationship between
social modernization and the relative importance of FDI alone; they
would not be correlated. (We would also hypothesize that the relative
importance of FDI to a society and its level of industrialization
would be uncorrelated
.
) Rather, FDI interacts with or intensifies
the relationship between social modernization and industrialization.
The relationship between social modernization and industrialization
is not the same — in terms of both magnitude and slope — at all levels
of FDI.
Research method
The investigation entails a quantitative, cross-sectional analysis
of variables over fifty-nine developing countries. All non-socialist
18bloc LDCs that were sovereign national units in 1965 and of sufficient

19
size (a population of over one million and a GNP of at least $500
million) to represent comparable national entities are included. At
the "upper limit" a LDC is defined by a GNP per capita of less than
20$1,000. The sole exception is Japan, which is eliminated (following
21
Kuznets) on the basis that its 1965 GNP per capita ($861) did not
reflect its level of socio-economic development. Appendix I provides
22
a country list.
The analysis can be broken down into three steps: quantification
of (or the development of indices representing) aspects of social
modernization, industrialization and the relative importance of FDI
;
establishing a relationship between the various aspects of social
modernization and industrialization; and last, adding FDI as a second
independent variable and determining the nature of its relationship
(if any) to social modernization.
Development of indices
23
The seventeen raw indicators of social development selected
to serve as a basis from which aspects of social modernization are
derived include both quantitative measures, such as literacy and
24
school enrollment ratios, derived from published sources and qualitative
estimates of such factors as social organization and tlie modernization
of outlook obtained primarily from the work of Adelman and Morris or
25
Banks and Textor. Missing data is estimated by reference to other
26
sources and by regression on similar and highly correlated indicators.
The raw data is comprised of a rather large number of indicators.
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which by definition (they are all intended as measures of social
development), are highly correlated and interrelated. The problem
faced is thus to reduce this mass of indicators to a smaller number
of variables, each of which represents a conceptually different
aspect of modernization. Factor analysis, which provides an c^ni])irlcal
27
means for deriving constructs from raw attributes, is used for this
purpose.
The index of industrialization consists of an unweighted linear
average of indices of power consumption per capita and the proportion
28
of GDP arising from the manufacturing sector. The definition of
industrialization (page 2 above) suggests power consumption per
capita as a logical indicator. Manufacturing GDP is added to provide
a measure of the breath of industrialization: vory resource-intensive
countries may consume relatively large amounts of power in an Isolated
economic (or geographic) sector.
The source for FDl data is the thorough study. Stock of Private
Direct Investments by D.A.C. Countries in Developing Countries, Year-End
1967
,
published by the O.E.C.D. in 1972. This reports book value by
29
sector and by country of origin in 1967. However, what is of interest
is not the absolute, but rather a relative measure of FDI — its impor-
tance to the host economy. Furthermore, as agricultural investment
tends to be rather singular in many respects, only non-agricuiturai
FDl is considered in this research. The index of FDT then consists of
non-agricultural book value divided by non-agricultural GDI' as a measure
of economic size. I'he final index is thus a measure of the relatlvr

-10-
importance of FDI to the host economy. (As development indicators are
often highly skewed, variables are transformed logarithmically if a
31
histogram indicates it would be appropriate.)
Social modernization and industrialization
The relationship between each of the aspects of social moderniza-
tion (derived via factor analysis) and industrialization is then established
through regression analysis with the former as the dependent variable.
32
Six zero-one dummy variables are included in the regression equations
to represent the major world regions — Latin America, Europe, North
33
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Near East and Asia — primarily as
proxies for differences in pre-industrial social structure. While
it is by no means suggested that the regions are even relatively
homogeneous, inter-regional differences — in terms of family organiza-
tion, for example — are sufficiently greater than intra-regional
differences to make the indicator valid as a proxy.
FDI: testing for interaction
The last step involves including FDI as a second independent
variable and determining the nature of the relationship, if any, between
it and social modernization. The problem can be summarized as follows:
SM = a + bIND + cFDI + dIND x FDI (1)
where SM represents a given aspect of social modernization, IND the
index of Industrialization and FDI the index of foreign dirert invest-
ment relative to economic size. If the coefficient c is significant,
an additive or direct relationship between social modernization and
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FDI would be confirmed. If d is significant, an interactive rela-
tionship would be indicated. (There is no reason to expect that
FDI — as a relative measure -- and IND would be correlated; in
point of fact, analysis indicates they are not.) However, the
conceptual framework posits that there is no direct relationship
between social modernization and FDI. If that is the case, c should
not be significant and the problem reduces to:
SM = a + bIND + dFDI x IND (2)
However, dFDI x IND specifies a particular multiplicative
relationship that may or may not "fit" the actual curve. The problem
can be circumvented by categorization and the use of dummy (zero-one)
variables. Thus both Industrialization .ind FDI arc c-aLi.>);or ized (their
respective ranges divided into four equal "levels") and rei)rc.sL"nted
by a series of four dummy variables. The term FDI x IND is then repre-
sented by a 4 X 4 matrix (FDI^IND^ to FDI, IND.) known as a system of114 4
"pattern" variables. FDI IND (or X ), for example, would be one if
a case is contained in both the lowest level of FDI and the lowest level
of industrialization.
If R is a dummy variable representing region and IND and FDI are
35
both in categorical form, then the additive model takes the form:
SM = a + b IND^ + . . . + b^IND^ + c^FDI^ + . . . c^FI^I^ (3)
+ d,R, + d,R,11 6 b
If X is a "pattern" variable the interactive model is then:
SM = a + b^X^ + h^X^ . . . + b^^X^^ + c^R^. . . . + c^K^ (4)
The hypothesis that a relationship between social modernization and
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FDI exists and is interactive rather than additive or direct is then
established by testing both models sequentially. With both independent
variables in dummy variable form, each aspect of social modernization
is regressed first on the additive (3) and then on the interactive (4)
2
model and the variance captured (R ) compared. The interactive
hypothesis is taken as confirmed if the interactive model accounts
for the significantly greater percentage of the variance of a given
37
aspect of social modernization than does the additive model.
Research findings
Factor analysis (using a principal axis solution) was apjilit'd to
seventeen raw indicators of social modernization and the factors
38
extracted were then submitted to a Varimax rotation. Both routines
are widely used and require little discussion. The raw indicator
variables are listed in table 1 and the matrix of rotated factor
loadings in Table 2. (Appendix II provides a more detailed list of
variables including data on measurement and sources.;
The loadings (shown in table 2) are a measure of the degree to
which a given variable is associated with a factor; they are correlation
2
coefficients between variables and factors. The column headed by li
contains communallties or the percentage of the common variance ol a
given variable accounted for by the factors in total; it Is the sum
of the squares of the loadings of a variable on each of the factors.
As the factors were orthogonally rotated, the loadings define the major
clusters of interrelationships among the variables and the factors are
independent. While Interpretation is necessarily subjective, the
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the meaning of a factor may be inferred from those variables loading
most highly on it.
Inspection of the factor matrix reveals that the three rotated
factors capture 71% of the variance the seventeen variables have
in common. Thus a considerable gain in simplicity has been achieved
ar a relatively low cost.
The variables which load most highly on the first factor
include the percentage in traditional agriculture (loading negatively)
,
the percentage in mining and manufacturing, the character of agricul-
tural organization, the importance of the middle class, dualism,
modernization of outlook, the character of the bureaucracy and the
influence exerted by associat ional groups. This factor then repre-
sents the movement from diffused and traditional agricultural roles
into more differentiated roles in the mining and manufacturing
industries and commericial agriculture and the associated general
40
societal changes. It is thus named role differentiation or roles.
The second factor is the most clearly defined and the easiest
to interpret. It includes literacy, the scliool enrollment ratios,
the index of human resource utilization, urbanization and transporta-
tion. As all are measures (or requisites of) horizontal or vertical
mobility, the factor is taken as a measure of mobility and will be
so named. (Literacy loads almost evenly across all three factors;
41
its loading on the second is highest by only .02. It is felt
however, that its inclusion with the second factor is justified as it
is both a prerequisite for mobility and a function of education.)
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Variables loading highest on the third factor include basic
family structure, the influence of non-associational groups and
cultural and linguistic fractionalization. As the last two load
negatively, this factor can be interpreted as encompassing the transi-
tion from tribes and extended families to nuclear families, a corres-
ponding lessening of the influence of non-associational groups and
and increasing integration and homogeneity of society as cultural
and linguistic differences break down. The third factor then
describes basic changes in the orgnization of a society and is
named social organization .
Social modernization and industrialization
The next step involves establishing a relationship between
42
the factor scores (aspects of modernization) and industrialization.
While, as expected, roles and industrialization are highly correlated
(a simple R of .90), mobility and social organization (the second
and third factors) turn out to be virtually uncorrelated with
industrialization. While this was certainly not anticipated — a
high correlation between the aspects of modernization and Industrial-
ization should follow from the definition of the former — It is a
function of the very high correlation of the first factor with
industrialization and the statistical independence of factor scores.
Factor analysis extracts statistically independent factors which
are, by definition, maintained through an orthogonal rotation. In
practice, the correlation between factors (or more precisely factor
scores) is virtually zero. Thus, in the case at hand, if the first
factor (roles) is both highly correlated with industrialization and
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independent of the second and third factors (mobility and social
organization), then the latter two factors must be virtually uncorrelated
with industrialization. While the "problem" this presents is exogenous
to the factor analysis (it arises only because we want to relate the
resulting scores to another variable — industrialization) it prevents
use of the scores for the second and third factors in further analysis.
The "problem" was circumvented by using the factor loadings as weights
in simple linear indicies composed of the variables loading most highly
on the second and third factors. While this procedure sacrifices the
independence of the factor scores, it allows development of indices
that represent the concepts embodied in the second and third factors
which can be used in further analysis.
The correlations between roles (factor scores), mobility, and
social organization (indices), and industrialization are shown in Table 3.
While mobility and social organization correlate strongly and positively
with industrialization, they do so at a lower level then does roles.
Equations five through seven show the results of regressing each
of the aspects of social modernization on the index of industrial ization
and tlie dummy variables representing re^j,loii. (^ily It'rms wiLli coi-l fie lents
significant at tlie .05 level are shown. The t statistic is shown In parenthesis.)
Roles = 2.52 + 4.07IND - .39Afr. + .56 Eur (R^ = .8?) (5)
(10.97) (-2.08) (2.14)
Mob. = -6.63 + 18.50IND (R^ = .80) (6)
(8.94)
Soc. Org. = 1.80 + 4.63IND - 4.08 Afr. + 4.41LA + 4.67Eur (7)
(2.60) (-4.56) (4.76) (3.72)
(R^ = .85)

-16-
Two points are in order. First, the Near East, North Africa
and Asia were not significant (at the .05 level) in any of the
equations. Only the "least" industrialized region (Africa) and the
two "most" industrialized regions (Latin America and Europe) appear.
Thus, region — as a proxy for pre-industrialized social structures
and/or relationships with the West -- is significant only at the
extremes of industrialization. Second, while adding region resulted
only in a moderate increase in the variance explained for roles and
mobility, it resulted in almost a doubling of tho R for social
organization (see table 3). Thus factors exogenous to industrial-
ization — in this instance we would suggest pre-industrial social
structures — account for half of the variance of social organization.
This appears reasonable; tribal organizations in Africa and tlie
nuclear family in parts of Latin America both preceded the introduction
of industrialization and are probably the most resistant to change
43
of the three aspects studied.
Foreign direct investment
At this point the hypothesis regarding the nature of thi' relation-
ship between social modernization and FDl (relative to economic size)
can be tested. First, FDI is simply added to equations five through
seven as a second independent variable to determine if a direct rela-
tionship exists. (Regional variables are not shown; as before the t
statistic is in parentheses.)
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2
Roles = -2.56 + 4.09TND - .OlFDI (R = .87) (8)
(9.41) (-.22)
Mob. = -6.95 + 19.29IND + 0.5FDI (R^ = .80) (9)
(8.08) (.13)
2
Soc. Org. = -.08 + 6.26IND - .54FDI (R = .85) (10)
(3.18) (-1.08)
It is clear that a direct or additive relationship cannot be
established between any of the aspects of social modernization and FDI
.
Only in the case of social organization does the coefficient of FDI
even approach significance at the .05 level and adding FDI does not
increase the explained variance (R ) compared with equations live
through seven.
As described above, the interactive hypothesis was tested by
2 44
comparing the R of categorized additive and interactive models.
The additive models are identical to equations eight through ten
excepting that IND and FDI are categorized and represented by two
sets of three zero-one dummy variables, (the dummy variables repre-
senting region are also included in each instance) . The regression
equations are shown In appendix III.
The interactive models consist of eacli of the aspects of
modernization regressed on the pattern variables created from FDI
and Industrialization and the dummies representing region. As
industrialization and FDI were both transformed into four level
categorical variables, their combination resulted in sixteen possible
pattern variables (a 4 x 4 matrix). However, it should be noted that
all interactive models did not contain sixteen pattern variables.
First, some of the pattern variables did not contain any cases.
45
Second, pattern variables were often combined where logical and
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where the combination did not result in any loss of explanatory power.
Equations eleven through thirteen show each of the aspects
of social modernization regressed on the pattern variables. Again,
only variables significant at the .05 level are shown and the
regional variables are not presented. In each instance X (FDI IND^
)
was dropped to avoid redundancy and X, (FDI-IND, ) contains no cases.
Where variables have been combined, they are shown as sums. (Visuali-
zation of the interactive models may be racllitated by refi'rence to
appendices IV, V and VI, which show the pattern variables in matrix
form.
)
Roles = -1.99 + 2.28X^ + 1.07(X, + X„ + X,„) + 1.38X, + (11)
J D 9 IJ D
1.94X^ + 2.57Xg + 1.80(X^Q + X^^) + 1.58X^^ +
2.65X,„ + 2.52X,, + 2.30X,, (R^ = .85)
11 15 io
Mob. = -4.59 + 11.56X^ + 5.51X, + 8.12X^ + 1U.99X„ + (12)JO/ cS
6.47(Xg + X^^) + 7.78(X^y + X^^) + 6.53 (X^^^ + X^^^)
+ 10.4(Xj2 + ^16^ ^^^ = -^^^
Soc. Org. = 1.68 + 5.32X2 "^ 5.94X2 4-4.61X^^ (R"^ = .89)
^^^^
2
The R for the categorized additive model (appendix 11 T) and the
interactive model (equations eleven through thirteen) are shown in table 4.
It should be noted that categorization of the additive model did not
2
result in a great loss of explanatory power. The R s shown in table 4
are only four to seven points lower than those of the continuous addi-
tive equations (8-10)
.
As can be seen, the interactive model captures a significantly
larger proportion of the variance of each aspect of social modiTu 1 zat ioii.
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(Signif icance is computed by means of an F test which accounts
for differences in degrees of freedom.) Thus, based upon the analysis
to this point we can conclude: (1) that there is no evidence of a
direct or additive relationship between FDI (per dollar of GDP) and
social modernization and (2) that an interactive relationship is
consistent with the data.
As noted above, appendices IV through VI contain the
interactive models, or systems of pattern variables, for each of
the aspects of modernization in matrix form. (Tlie bottom row and
last column represent the highest levels of FDI and industrialization
respectively.) While caution is necessary when analyzing the re-
gression coefficients, several points can l)c' noted. First, as
would be expected from the very strong corrclatioa between each of
the aspects of social modernization and industrialization, tlie
coefficients are generally larger at higher levels of industrializa-
tion. Second, the relationship between social modernization and
industrialization is not the same at all levels of FDI; interaction
47
is present. Third, with one insignificant exception, all toeffi-
cients have positive signs. FDI intensifies Che relationship between
social modernization and industrialization. Last there is no pattern
of interaction obvious from the coefficients of the pattern variables.
Conclusions
Any conclusions that can be drawn from this research are limited
by both data and methodological problems. As in most cross-national
research across large numbers of developing countries the raw data Is
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A8
weak in terms of both accuracy and comparability. Furthermore,
the usual problems encountered when one attempts to establish causal
49
relationships at the societal level are exacerbated by reliance
on cross-sectional analysis. Investigating historical phenomena
cross-sectionally requires an assumption that individual observations
represent points on a longitudinal path. This obviously does not
present a very good picture of reality, and while not destroying the
usefulness of the analysis, it limits how far one can take the results.
Given these caveats, what can be concluded from this research?
At this point, only that theory and reality do not conflict. The
existence of an interactive, and the absence of an additive, relation-
ship supports the hypothesis that FDI , as a direct and continuous
agent of inter-cultural contact, intensifies the relationship between
social modernization and industrialization. That given the presence
of FDI, a society is likely to be more "modernized," in the sense
in which that term is used in this research, than one would expect
given its level of industrialization. However, further research is
needed to more completely define the interactive model to allow its
use as a basis for prediction and policy making. Efforts are needed
in two directions. First, research on the micro-level to gain a
better understanding of the differences between indigenous and foreign
controlled firms and their interaction with the process of social
modernization. Second, an improvement in the accuracy and compar-
ability of data on the macro or cross-national level. While problems
J 52
with socio-economic indicators are well-known and widely discussed.
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the weakest link in this research was the data on Foreign Direct
Investment. Both conceptual and operational problems — the reliance
on the book value concept and lack of time-series data, for example —
severely limit research in this area.
One last, and important caveat is required. A research
conclusion is not a policy recommendation. This paper has considered
FDI within very rigid limits; its relationship with social modernization
as narrowly defined. Most government policy makers obviously face
an infinitely more diverse and complex reality. Thus, it does not
follow, that even if accelerating the rate of social modernization
is an accepted goal, the gates should be indiscriminately opened to
an inward flow of FDI.
This research was undertaken under the explicit assumption
that FDI need not be a zero-sum game. Under a wide range of circum-
54
stances, and given a proper framework of regulation , agreements
should be attainable that provide both a reasonable return to the
investor and a net positive contribution to development objectives.
Thus, it is hoped that this research can mark a step towards
determining the non-economic effects of FDI on a scientific basis.
Once facts are established, policy makers can rationally evaluate
the place of FDI in development plans, to the benefit of the host
country and the investor alike.
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Table 1
Social Indicator Variables
1. The percentage of the active population in traditional, agriculture.
2. The percentage employed in mining and manufacturing industries.
3. The character of agricultural organization reflecting the range
between peasant farming and modern commeriial agriculture.
4. The importance of the indigenous middle class.
5. The extenL of dualism.
6. Modernization of outlook.
7. The efficiency and modernization of the bureaucracy.
8. The extent of interest articulation by associational groups.
9. Literacy.
10. First and second level school enrollment ratio.
11. Third level school enrollment ratio.
12. Human resource utilization; ten plus eleven with the latter
weighted by a factor of five.
13. Urbanization; the percentage of the population in cities of
100,000 or more.
14. Transportation; an index of road and rail length per unit of
area adjusted for the concentration of population.
15. Basic family structure reflecting a range from tribal units
to nuclear families.
16. The extent of interest articulation by non-associational or
ascriptive groups; ethnic, kinship and lineage groups and the like.
17. An index of cultural and linquistic fractionalization.
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Table 2
Factor Analysis of Social Modernization
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Table 3
Correlations of Revised Indices of
Social Modernization with Industrialization
Roles
*Mobility
*Social Organization
.90
,85
.70
.81
.72
.49
*revised indices
Table 4
Variance Explained by Categorized
Additive and Interactive Models
Aspect
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Appendix I
The Country List
Africa
Cameroon
Congo (Kinshasa)*
Ethiopia
Ghana
Ivory Coast
Kenya
The Malagasy Republic
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa**
Sudan
Uganda
Tanzania
Zambia
North Africa
Algeria
Libya
Morocco
Tunesia
United Arab Republic
Latin America
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Panama
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
*Now Zaire
**Not included in the analysis of foreign direct investment
The Near East
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Syria
Asia
Burma
Cambodia
Ceylon
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
South Korea
la Iwan
Thailand
Vietnam
Europe
Greece
Portugal**
Spain
Turkey
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Appendix II
Sources and Measurement of Social Variables
1. Percentage of the economically active population in traditional
agriculture. (Adelman and Morris, cross-checked against U.N, and I.L.O.
data.)
2. Percentage of the economically active population in mining and
manufacturing. (Yearbook of Labor Statistics.)
3. Character of agricultural organization reflecting the range from
peasant farming to modern commercial agriculture. Countries were divided
into groups based upon area studies and the classifications were then
validated through interviews with experts. (Adelman and Morris.)
4. Importance of the indigenous middle class. An estimate based upon
(1) the percentage of the population engaged in middle class occupations
and (2) a qualitative assessment of the importance of expatriates.
(Adelman and Morris.)
5. The extent of dualism. A qualitative estimate of the degree of separa-
tion of the traditional and modern sectors. Countries are divided into
groups (as described under three above) ranging from an overwhelmingly
traditional economy to the relatively complete integration of traditional
and modern sectors. (Adelman and Morris.)
5. Modernization of outlook. A qualitative estimate (perhaps the most
subjective used in this study) of the modernization (in terms of lifestyle)
of educated urban groups and the degree of acceptance of programs of
social and political modernization among both urban and rural populations.
(Adelman and Morris.)
7. The efficiency and modernization of the bureaucracy. An estimate
(countries were divided into four groups) of the efficiency and ascriptive
versus achievement orientation of the civil service. Efficiency is judged
in terms of functionally specific relationships and rational decision making.
(Banks and Textor.)
8. The extent of interest articulation by associational groups. This re-
flects the influence of voluntary groups, such as trade unions and civic
associations. (Banks and Textor.)
9. Literacy. The percentage of the adult population (generally over fifteen
years of age) that meets a given country's standard of literacy. (Taylor
and Hudson.)
10. First and second level school enrollment ratio. The percentage of
appropriate age groups enrolled in primary and secondary schools. (Taylor
and Hudson.)
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11. Third level enrollment ratio. The percentage of appropriate age
groups ^i^'^olled i^ university. (U.N.E. S.C.O. Statistical Yearbook.)
12. An index of human resource utilization. A linear combination of
variables ten and eleven with the latter weighted by a factor of five.
The index is suggested in Harbison, Frederick and Myers, C.A. Education
,
Manpower and Economic Development . New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.
13. Urbanization. The percentage of the population living in cities of
100,000 or more. (Taylor and Hudson, and Banks.)
14. Transportation. An index, original to this research, intended as
a measure of the potential for horizontal mobility and economic inde-
pendence. The index is composed of a measure of road and rail length
per unit of area multipled by an index of the concentration of the popu-
lation. The latter is scored so that the more concentrated the popula-
tion (a greater proportion living in a few large cities rather than in
many smaller ones) the higher the index. It is assumed that, ceteris
paribus, countries with more diffused populations will tend to have larger
transportation networks relative to area. (The Statesman's Yearbook .
London: MacMillan, 1967 and 1972; Ginsburg, Norton. Atlas of Economic
Development . Chicago: University of Chicago I'ress, 1961; and Taylor
and Hudson.
)
15. Basic family structure. Countries were grouped into three classes:
those in which tribal allegiances are widespread, those in which the
extended family is the norm and those in which the nuclear family pre-
dominates. (Adelman and Morris.)
16. The extent of interest articulation by non-associational groups.
This reflects the importance of ascriptive groups such as clans and
tribes in a society. The index is qualitative; countries were divided
into groups based upon country studies. (Banks and Textor.)
17. Cultural and linquistic fractionalization. Countries are scored on
a scale ranging from .00 (extremely homogeneous) to .99 (extremely
fractionalized) . (Atlas Narodov Mira , Academy of Sciences, Moscow,
reported in Taylor and Hudson.)
Sources
Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Society, Politics and Economic
Development . (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967).
Arthur S. Banks, Cross-Polity Time-Series Data . (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971)
Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey . (Cambridge:
MIT press, 1963).
Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political
and Social Indicators: Second Edition . (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1972).
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Appendix III
Categorized Additive Models*
Roles = -1.21 + .68IND/2 + 1.13IND/3 + 1.88IND/4 + .99EUR (1)
(3.08)** (4.46) (6.07) (2.56)
(R^ = .80)
Mob = .08 + 2.54IND/2 + 4.83IND/3 + 8.41IND/4 (2)
(2.12) (3.47) (4.95)
(R^ = .71)
Soc. Org. = 4.97 + 2.71IND/4 - 3.59Afr. + 4. 73L.A. + 4.47Eur . (3)
(2.31) (3.28) (4.78) (3.05)
(R^ = .85)
*0nly terms whose coefficients are significant at the .05 level
are included.
**t statistic
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Appendix IV
Role Differentiation — Interactive Model
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Appendix V
Mobility — Interactive Model
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Appendix VI
Basic Social Organization — Interactive Model
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1 a ^
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.
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ri ra ^ & &
of freedom, E. the error sum of squares for the interactive model
and D . the corresponding degrees of freedom. See N. R. Draper and
H. Smith, Applied Regression Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1961,) p. 119.
37
One the term cFDI is dropped from equation (1) , regressing
social modernization on equations (3) and (4) sequentially is analogous
to testing for interaction via (2). The independent variables are,
of course, categorized in (3) and (4).
38
The varimax routine is an orthogonal procedure which "force fits"
the factors to a statistically independent relationship. While
this is generally useful, the possibility exists that the factors may
represent constructs which are not in reality independent. To investi-
gate this possibility an oblique rotation (promax) was attempted. Re-
sults, however, aere virtually identical to those produced by the
varimax rotation.
39
Please refer to the authors dissertation for a more complete
description of variables including sources. Stephen J. Kobrin, "Foreign
Direct Investment, Industrialization and Social Change: Acculturation
and Modernization in Developing Countries" (Ph.D. diss.. The University
of Michigan, 1975).
40
The names given to factors are intended only as mnemonic devices
and not as self-sufficient descriptions of processes encompassed.

-40-
41
This may quite accurately reflect literacy's central role in
modernization. See Daniel Lerner, Thq Passing of Traditional Society:
Modernizing the Middle East (New York: The Free Press, 1958), p. 64.
^2^
, , . ^ . ^ .Factor scores are simply scores for each case for each factor
derived from the loadings and the original variables. Each variable
is weighted proportionally to its involvement in the factor. See
Rudolph J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1970), p. 150.
43
Levy, p. 232; Moore, "Industrialization and Social Change," p. 110;
and Melvin M. Tumin, "Competing Status Systems," in Moore and Feldman,
p. 315.
44
Each of the aspects of social modernization was regressed on a
continuous interactive model (equation 2). However, the coefficient
of the interactive term (cFDI x IND) did not even approach significance
at the .05 level. Thus categorized (dummy variable) models were used
to avoid problems of "fitting" a non-linear model.
45
One could, for example, logically combine the first and second
levels of Industrialization for thv third level of FDl . It would
make no sense, however, to combine tlie first level of industrialisation
and the third level of FDI with the entry representing the second
level of industrialization and the fourth level of FDI.
46
See note 36.
47
A first order interaction implies that the relationship between
either of the independent variables and the dependent variable is not
constant for all values of the other independent variables. See Hubert
M. Blalock jr.. Theory Construction (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,

-41-
1969), p. 155.
48
John V. Gillespie, An Introduction to Macro Cross-National
Research," in Macro Quantitative Analysis: Conflict Development and
Democratization (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 21 and
McGranahan, Contents and Measurement
, p. vii.
49
The obvious problem in attempting to prove causality at the
societal level (or perliaps in any but the most rigidly controlled
experiment) Is the impossibility of Isolating the variables in
question. For a thorough discussion of the matter see Hubert M.
Blalock jr. , Causal Inferences in Non-Experimental Research (Durham:
University of North Carolina Press, 1964; Norton and Company, 1972).
Adelman and Morris, p. 149 and Bruce M. Russett, "The Yale
Political Data Program: Experience and Prospects," in Merritt and
Rokkan, p. 104.
The author's dissertation, on which this paper is based, contains
a case study of industrialization and social modernization in Mexico
and Venezuela. The micro study was included as an attempt to "observe"
the processes under consideration, over time, in two societies which
differed significantly in their utilization of FDI
.
52
Gillespie, p. 21; McGranahan, Contents and Measurement
,
p. vii;
Rusett, "The Yale Political Data Program," p. 98; and Taylor and Hudson, p. 7,
53
While U.S. data on direct investment for the past twenty years
is fairly complete, data from other countries (with the possible ex-
ception of the U.K.) is rather sketchy. Further, there is a major prob-

-42-
lem of comparability, even where data from several source countries
exists. The O.E.C.D. study, used as the basic source of FDl data
in this research, stands virtually alone. It should be inherently
obvious to the most casual observer that adequate FDI data, which can
be disaggregated by host and source country and by economic sector,
is an absolute prerequisite to further empirical work which can
serve as a basis for either prediction or policy making.
54
Barbara Ward; J. D. Runnals; and Lenore D'Anjou, The Widening
Gap (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 2.



